Charles Kahn

Charles Kahn

Professor Emeritus of Finance

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340 Wohlers Hall

1206 S. Sixth

Champaign, IL 61820

217-333-2813

cmkahn@illinois.edu

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Educational Background

  • Ph.D., Economics, Harvard University, 1981
  • B.A. (M.A.), Honors, Economics, University of Cambridge, 1977
  • B.A., Summa Cum Laude, Applied Mathematics, Harvard University, 1975

Positions Held

  • Research Fellow, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank, 2016-2018
  • Visiting Scholar, Bank of Canada, 2016-2018
  • Consultant, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 2009-2017
  • Chair, Finance Department, University of Illinois, 2009-2012
  • Houblon Norman Fellow, Bank of England, 2007-2008
  • Visiting Tan-Chin Tuan Professor of Economics, National University of Singapore, 2007
  • Consultant, Bank of England, 2004-2006
  • Research on development of payments arrangements, Mastercard International, 2004-2005
  • Consultant on Target 2 payments system, European Central Bank, 2004
  • Overseas Fellow, Churchill College, Cambridge University, 1999-2000
  • Fred S. Bailey Memorial Chair of Finance, University of Illinois, 1997-2015
  • Visiting Fellow, Australian National University, 1994
  • Co-director, Office of Banking Research, University of Illinois, 1992-2014
  • Professor of Economics, University of Illinois, 1990-2015
  • Associate Professor of Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1988-1990
  • Associate Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, 1986-1989
  • Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago, 1981-1985

Recent Publications

  • Park, H., & Kahn, C. Forthcoming (2018). Collateral, Rehypothecation, and Efficiency. Journal of Financial Intermediation,.
  • Kahn, C. (2018). The Threat of Privacy. Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 6 (2/3), 21-30.
  • Kahn, C., Linares-Zegarra, J., & Stavins , J. (2017). Are there Social Spillovers in Consumers' Security Assessments of Payment Instruments? Journal of Financial Services Research, 52 (1), 5-34.
  • France, V., & Kahn, C. (2016). Law as a constraint on bailouts: Emergency support for central counterparties. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 28, Issue C 22-31.
  • Kahn, C., & Park, H. (2016). Collateral chains and Incentives. Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 5 (1), 1-16.  link >
  • Kahn, C., & Linares-Zegarra, J. (2016). Identity Theft and Consumer Payment Choice: Does Security Really Matter? Journal of Financial Services Research, (1),
  • Kahn, C., & Carbo-Valverde, S. (2016). Payment Systems in the US and Europe: Efficiency, Soundness and Challenges. Financial Stability Journal (Bank of Spain), (30), 11-33.
  • Kahn, C., Quinn, S., & Roberds, W., Michael D. Bordo, Oyvind Eitrheim, Marc Flandreau and Jan F. Qvigstad (Ed.) (2016). Central Banks and Payment Systems: The Evolving Trade-off between Cost and Risk. Central Banks at a Crossroads: What Can We Learn from History? ( pp. 563-609). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Other Publications

Article

  • Antinolfi, G., Carapella, F., Kahn, C., Martin, A., Mills, D., & Nosal, E. (2015). Repos, Fire Sales and Bankruptcy Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics, 18 (1), 21-31.  link >
  • Kahn, C. (2013). Private Payment Systems, Collateral, and Interest Rates. Annals of Finance, 9 (1), 83-114.
  • Kahn, C. (2011). Comment on "Precautionary Demand and Liquidity in Payment Systems" by Gara M. Afonso and Hyun Song Shin. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 43, Supplement s2 621-623.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2009). Payments Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 41 (5), 855-884.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2009). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18 1-23.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Credit and Identity Theft. Journal of Monetary Economics, 55 251-264.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (4), 955-978.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2006). Who Should Act As Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model': A Comment. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 38 (4), 1111-1118.
  • Kahn, C., McAndrews, J., & Roberds, W. (2005). Money Is Privacy. International Economic Review, 46 (2), 377-399.
  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2005). Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Management Science, 51 (3), 356-371.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Allocating Bank Regulatory Power: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. European Economic Review, 49 (8), 2107-2136.  link >
  • Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2005). Bank Consolidation and the Dynamics of Consumer Loan Interest Rates. Journal of Business, 78 (1, Part 2), 99-133.
  • Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2004). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Journal of Finance, 59 (6), 2531-2575.
  • Kahn, C. (2004). Comment on 'Competition and Financial Stability' by Allen and Gale. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36 (3; part 2),
  • Kahn, C., Roberds, W., & McAndrews, J. (2003). Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 35 (4), 591-608.
  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2002). Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins. Southern Economic Journal, 68 (3), 617-31.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2002). The Economics of Payment Finality. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 87 30-39.
  • Colwell, P., & Kahn, C. (2001). Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 23 (3), 267-296.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2001). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 47 (2), 299-319.
  • Kahn, C., Silva, E., & Ziliak, J. (2001). Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. Economic Journal, 111 (468), 188-205.
  • Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (1999). Bank Deposit Rate Clustering: Theory and Empirical Evidence. Journal of Finance, 54 (6), 2185-2214.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 31 (3; part 2), 500-525.
  • Kahn, C., & Tsoulouhas, T. (1999). Strategic Transmission of Information and Short-Term Commitment. Economic Theory, 14 (1), 131-153.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The Design of Wholesale Payments Networks: The Importance of Incentives. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review, 30-39.
  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1999). Calibration of a Model of the Afternoon Effect in Cattle Auctions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 39 (1), 113-128.
  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. Economic Theory, 12 (2), 227-258.
  • Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1998). Competition and Incentives with Nonexclusive Contracts. RAND Journal of Economics, 29 (3), 443-465.
  • Kahn, C. (1998). One-Stop Shopping for Settlement Services: RESPA, Referral Fees, and Consumer Reaction. Illinois Real Estate Letter,.
  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Uniform-Price Auctions with Variable Awards. Games and Economics Behavior, 23 (1), 25-42.
  • Kahn, C. (1998). Multi-Unit Pay-Your-Bid Auctions with Variable Awards. Games and Economics Behavior, 23 25-42.
  • Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (1998). Ownership Structure, Speculation and Shareholder Information. Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 99-130.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Review of Financial Studies, 11 (4), 845-870.
  • Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1996). The Efficiency of Self Regulated Payments Systems: Leaming from the Suffolk System. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 28 (4), 766-797.
  • Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1995). Market Failure with Moral Hazard and Side Trading. Journal of Public Economics, 58 (2), 159-184.
  • Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1995). Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy. Journal of Economic Theory, 66 (1), 113-138.
  • Calomiris, C., Kahn, C., & Longhofer, S. (1994). Housing-Finance Intervention and Private Incentives: Helping Minorities and the Poor. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 26 (3), 634-674.
  • Kahn, C., & Yavas, A. (1994). The Economic Role of Foreclosures. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 8 (1), 35-51.
  • Kahn, C., & Silva, E. (1993). Exclusion and Moral Hazard: The Case of Identical Demand. Journal of Public Economics, 52 (2), 217-235.
  • Kahn, C., & Longhofer, S. (1993). An Equilibrium Model of Quits Under Optimal Contracting. European Economic Review, 37 (6), 1203-1222.
  • Kahn, C., & Reagan, P. (1993). Introducing Work Rules into Models of Wage-Employment Contracts. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 33 (3), 217-231.
  • Kahn, C. (1993). The Existence and Characterization of Optimal Contracts on a Continuous State Space. Journal of Economic Theory, 59 122-144.
  • Kahn, C., & Krasa, S. (1993). Non Existence and Inefficiency of Equilibria with American Options and Convertible Bonds. Economic Theory, 3 (1),
  • Kahn, C. (1992). The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Coalition-Proof Equilibrium in Infinite Games. Games and Economics Behavior, 101-121.
  • Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1991). The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements. American Economic Review, 81 497-513.
  • Kahn, C. (1991). The Economic Role of Foreclosure Rules. Illinois Real Estate Letter, 8-11.
  • Englebrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1991). Protecting the Winner: Second-Price Versus Oral Auctions. Economics Letters, 35 243-248.
  • Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1990). Cooperative Arrangements for the Regulation of Banking by Banks. Illinois Business Review,.
  • Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1989). Default, Foreclosure and Strategic Renegotiation. Law and Contemporary Problems, 52 49-61.
  • Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. (1988). Strategic Renegotiation. Economics Letters, 28 117-121.
  • Kahn, C., & Mookherjee, D. (1988). A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103 609-645.
  • Kahn, C., & Huberman, G. (1988). Two-Sided Uncertainty and Up-or-Out Contracts. Journal of Labor Economics, 6 423-443.
  • Huberman, G., & Kahn, C. (1988). Limited Contract Enforcement and Strategic Renegotiation. American Economic Review, 78 (3), 471-484.
  • Kahn, C., Malueg, D., & Solow, J. (1988). Erratum: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. Econometrica, 56 754.
  • Kahn, C. (1988). The Use of Complicated Models as Explanations: A Re-examination of Williamson's Late 19th Century America. Research in Economic History, 11 185-216.
  • Kahn, C. (1986). The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs. Econometrica, 54 (2), 275-294.
  • Kahn, C. (1985). Optimal Severance Pay with Incomplete Information. Journal of Political Economy, 93 (3), 435-451.
  • Kahn, C., & Scheinkman, J. (1985). Optimal Employment Contracts with Bankruptcy Constraints. Journal of Economic Theory, 35 (2), 343-365.
  • Green, J., & Kahn, C. (1983). Wage-Employment Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98 173-187.
  • Blanchard, O., & Kahn, C. (1980). The Solution of Linear Difference Models Under Rational Expectations. Econometrica, 48 1305-1311.

Chapter in a Book

  • Kahn, C., Pietro Catte, Andrea Gerali, Franco Passacantando (Ed.) (2015). Evolution of money and payment systems: private versus public institutions and the role of collateral. Money and Monetary Institutions after the Crisis: Proceedings of the Conference in Memory of Curzio Giannini ( pp. 163-188). Banca d'Italia.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W., Ritzer, George (Ed.) (2012). Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS). Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Globalization England: John Wiley & Sons.
  • Espinosa-Vega, M., Sole, J., Kahn, C., & Matta, R., Stijn Claessens, Douglas D Evanoff, George G. Kaufman and Laura Kodres (Ed.) (2011). Some Implications of Systemic Risk and the Design of Regulatory Architecture. Macrorudential Regulatory Policies: The New Road to Financial Stability World Scientific Publishing Co.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J., Mayes, D.G., and G.E. Wood (Ed.) (2007). Institutional Allocation of Bank Regulation: A Review. The Structure of Financial Regulation ( pp. 185-204). New York: Routledge.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J., George M. von Furstenberg, Volbert Alexander, and Jacques Melitz (Ed.) (2004). Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial Development and Stability Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Kahn, C., George Tolley, Donald Kenkel and Robert Fabian (Ed.) (1994). Modeling of Choices with Uncertain Preferences. Health Values for Policy: An Economic Approach Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
  • Kahn, C., & Asilis, C., B. Dutta et al. (Ed.) (1992). Semi-Stability in Game Theory: A Survey of Ugliness. Papers in Game Theory and Economic Applications: Procedings of An International Conference Held at the Indian Statistical Institute Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
  • Kahn, C., Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (Ed.) (1992). A Linear Programming Solution to the Slave Diet. Without Consent or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery ( pp. 522-535). New York: W. W. Norton and Company.
  • Kahn, C., Robert Fogel and Stanley Engerman (Ed.) (1992). An Agency Theory Approach to Slave Incentives. Without Consent or Contract: Technical Papers on Slavery ( pp. 551-565). New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

Conference Proceeding

  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2001). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? ( vol. 54, pp. 191-226). Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
  • Calomiris, C., & Kahn, C. (1988). Demandable Debt as the Optimal Banking Contract. ( pp. 35-43). Garn Institute of Finance Symposium on Federal Insurance.

Other Publication

  • Kahn, C. (2010). Editor, "Effective Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems: Maintaining financial plumbing" Henry Stewart Talks Series.
  • Kahn, C. (1992). "What Discounts? Only Lawyers Will Gain from Airline Class-Action Suit" Atlanta Journal and Constitution, August 18, and "Airline Suit Settlement is a Gift for the Lawyers," Baltimore Evening Sun, Aug.
  • Kahn, C. (1991). "Keep Banks on the Straight and Narrow," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 22.
  • Kahn, C. (1990). Book Review: Roger Bowden's "Statistical Games and Human Affairs" for Journal of Economic Literature, Vol 28. September, 1990, pp. 1213-1215.

Presentation

  • Antinolfi, G., Carapalla, F., Kahn, C., Martin, A., Mills, D., & Nosal, E. (2013). Repos, Fire Sales, and Bankruptcy Policy. Review of Economic Dynamics/Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Conference on Money, Credit and Financi.
  • Espinosa-Vega, M., Kahn, C., Matta, R., & Sole, J. (2010). Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture. Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C. (2010). Systemic Risk and Optimal Regulatory Architecture. Thirteenth Annual International Banking Conference, Chicago Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Recent Developments in Theories of Money, Banking, and Asset Markets, University of Wisconsin – Madi.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Bank for International Settlements.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. New York Federal Reserve 4th annual Money and Payments Workshop.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payments, and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Workshop on Payments Systems, Collateral And Liquidity, Bank of Canada.
  • Kahn, C., & Wagner, W. (2009). Lender of last resort, crisis resolution and liquidity policy. Centre for Banking Studies Research Forum: Lender of last resort, crisis resolution and liquidity po.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Collateral Policy in a World of Round-the-Clock Payment. Chicago Federal Reserve Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral, and Interest Rates. China International Conference in Finance.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Global Market Integration and Financial Crises, Organized by the Center for Asian Financial Markets.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Bank of Korea.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2009). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. Korean Institute of Finance.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  • Kahn, C. (2009). Financial Regulation in the Crisis and Beyond. Capital Markets Board of Turkey International Conference "Global Financial Markets and Future of R.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. "Payments and Networks," conference sponsored by the Laboratory for Aggregate Economics and Finance.
  • Kahn, C. (2008). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Bank of Canada workshop "Payments Economics: Theory and Policy".
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. International Monetary Fund.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Liquidity, Payment and Endogenous Financial Fragility. CES-Ifo and Deutsche Bundesbank, Joint Conference on Liquidity: Concepts and Risks.
  • Kahn, C. (2008). Offshore Settlement, Collateral and Interest Rates. Oxford Financial Research Summer Symposium.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Bank of Norway.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Bank of Finland.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Tilburg University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. Nottingham University.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2008). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Lancaster University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2008). Why Pay? An Introduction to Payments Economics. European Central Bank.
  • Kahn, C. (2007). Efficiency of Payment Systems. Reserve Bank of India.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. London School of Economics.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Oxford University.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Cass Business School, London City University.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. European Central Bank.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Claremont-McKenna College.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2007). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Cambridge University.
  • Kahn, C. (2007). Liquidity Policy and Payment. Workshop on Liquidity Research, Bank of England.
  • Kahn, C. (2007). Why Pay? The Economics of Payments and Payment Systems. Public Lecture, National University of Singapore.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Credit and Identity Theft. Southern Methodist University.
  • Kahn, C. (2007). A Theory of Payments. National University of Singapore.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2007). Credit and Identity Theft. National University of Singapore.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2006). Credit and Identity Theft. DePaul University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. University of Illinois at Chicago.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. FDIC Center for Financial Research 5th Annual Banking Research Conference, "Emerging Risks in Bankin.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Credit and Identity Theft. Conference at the University of Toronto, "Research on Money and Markets".
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. European Finance Association Annual Meeting.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2005). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Banco de Portugal conference "Financial Fragility and Bank Regulation".
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2005). Payment Settlement: Tiering in Private and Public Systems. Bank of England Conference, "The Future of Payments".
  • Kahn, C. (2004). Money is Privacy. Clarence Tow Conference on the Theory of Money, Transactions, and Financial Itermediation.
  • Kahn, C., McAndrews, J., & Roberds, W. (2004). Money is Privacy. Models of Monetary Economics II: The Next Generation.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Bloomington, IN.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Hightower Lecture, Emory Universtiy.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Catholic University of Brasilia, Brazil.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). Overview of Auctions Research. Research Group of the Treasury Department of Brazil, Brasilia, Brazil.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). A Theory of Payments. Conference of the Society for Advancement of Economic Theory, Rodos, Greece.
  • Kahn, C. (2003). Endogenous Financial Fragility and Prudential Regulation. Wharton/CFS Conference.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2003). Payments Settlement under Limited Enforcement: Private versus Public Systems. Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting.
  • Kahn, C. (2002). RESPA, Middlement and Regulation. Federal Trade Commission.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2002). Transferability, Finality and Debt Settlement. Purdue University.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. Western Finance Association Annual Meetings, 2011.
  • Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2002). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Lending of Last Resort and Supervision in the Euro Area. Fordham University.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2002). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. American Finance Association Meetings.
  • Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2002). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. American Finance Association Meetings.
  • Kahn, C., & Winton, A. (2001). Moral Hazard and Optimal Subsidiary Structure for Financial Institutions. Cowles Foundation, Yale University Conference.
  • Kahn, C. (2001). Transferability, Finality, and Debt Settlement. Cleveland Federal Reserve payments conference.
  • Kahn, C., & Santos, J. (2001). Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort, Deposit Insurance and Supervision. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
  • Kahn, C. (2001). A Theory of Transactions Privacy. Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2001). Bank Consolidation and Consumer Loan Rates. Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C., Roberds, W., & McAndrews, J. (2001). Settlement Risk under Gross and Net Settlement. ASSA Meetings.
  • Kahn, C. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Washington University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Tulane University.
  • Kahn, C. (2000). Economic Functions of Referrals and Referral Fees. Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C., Pennacchi, G., & Sopranzetti, B. (2000). Bank Consolidation and consumer Loan Interest Rates. Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Nuffield College of Oxford University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (2000). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Bank of England.
  • Kahn, C. (2000). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Royal Holloway College, University of Surrey.
  • Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1999). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Universite de Toulouse.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? London School of Economics.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). The CLS Bank: A Solution to the Risks of International Payments Settlement? Bank of Norway.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Clarence Tow Conference on the Theory of Money, Transactions, and Financial Itermediation.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1999). Real Time Gross Settlement and the Costs of Immediacy. Federal Reserve Bank.
  • Kahn, C. (1999). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. University of Texas.
  • Kahn, C. (1999). Performace-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects. World Bank Seminar.
  • Kahn, C. (1999). Research on Payments Systems. Cambridge University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. I.T.A.M.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Cleveland Federal Reserve/Journal of Money Credit and Banking Conference.
  • Kahn, C. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Carnegie Mellon University.
  • Kahn, C., & Roberds, W. (1998). Demandable Debt as a Means of Payment: Bank Notes vs. Checks. Society for Economic Dynamic Meetings.
  • Kahn, C. (1998). On the Role of Bank Coalitions in the Provision of Liquidity. Chicago Federal Reserve Bank Structure Conference.
  • Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1998). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Conference on Auctions/National Science Foundation.
  • Kahn, C. (1998). On the Role of Bank Coalitions in the Provision of Liquidity. University of British Columbia.
  • Kahn, C. (1997). Multi-goods Auctions with Private Values. Stockholm School of Economics.
  • Kahn, C. (1997). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Bank of Norway.
  • Kahn, C. (1997). Payment System Settlement and Bank Incentives. Western Economic Association Meetings.

Working Paper

  • Fos, V., & Kahn, C. Governance through Threats of Intervention and Exit.

Service

  • Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Market Infrastructures, 2016 to present
  • Associate Editor, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 2013 to present

Teaching Interests

Teaching interests: Financial institutions, game theory.

Research Interests

A specialist in the economics of information and uncertainty, his research focuses on the applications of the theory of contracts and incentives to banking and financial intermediation. Current projects include an examination of arrangements for payment systems, including clearing houses, wire-transfers, and electronic moneys. He has been a Houblon-Norman Fellow of the Bank of England and is currently a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.

Current Courses

  • Seminar in Corporate Finance (FIN 594) Theories, paradigms, and models of nonfinancial corporations; investigates the theoretical foundations and empirical evidence regarding corporate resource allocation, capital structure decisions, and dividend policies; covers in detail contingent claim analysis, signaling theory, and agency theory.

Contact

340 Wohlers Hall

1206 S. Sixth

Champaign, IL 61820

217-333-2813

cmkahn@illinois.edu

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