Listings
Educational Background
- Ph.D., Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University, 1977
- M.S., Management, Northwestern University, 1975
- B.S., Mathematics, SUNY at Stony Brook, 1971
Positions Held
- Associate Professor Emeritus of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 2008 to present
- Associate Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1986-2008
- Associate Professor, Washington University, 1982-1986
- Assistant Professor, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1976-1982
- Adjunct Faculty, Mundelein College, 1975-1976
Recent Publications
- Cohen, S., Loeb, M., & Stark, A. (1992). Separating Controllable Performance from Non-Controllable Performance: The Case of Optimal Procurement Contracting. Management Accounting Research, 3 291-306.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1990). Implicit Cost Allocation and Bidding for Contracts. Management Science, 36 (9), 1133-1138.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1990). On the Optimality of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Joint Costs. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8 (9), 405-416.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1989). The Demand for Cost Allocaitons: The Case of Incentive Contracts Versus Fixed-Price Contracts. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 8 (3), 165-180.
Other Publications
Articles
- Cohen, S., & Starks, L. (1988). Incdentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers. Management Science, 34 (9), 1067-1079.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1988). Imporving Performance Through Cost Allocation. Contemporary Accounting Research, 5 (1), 70-95.
- Cohen, S. (1986). Truth Telling, Dominant Strategies and Iterative Groves Mechanisms. Public Choice, 51 (3), 333-343.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1984). The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard. Management Science, 30 (1), 20-24.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1982). Public Goods, Common Inputs and the Efficiency of Full-Cost Allocations. The Accounting Review, 57 (2), 336-347.
- Cohen, S. (1980). Incentives, Iterative Communication and Organizational Control. Journal of Economic Theory, 22 (1), 37-55.
- Cohen, S. (1980). Incentives and the Choice of Optimal Plans. American Economic Review, 71 (4), 756-762.
Presentations
- Cohen, S., & Wu, J. (1998). Why Should We Pay an Agent for Bad News? INFORMS Conference.
- Cohen, S., & Ma, S. (1995). Long Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment. INFORMS Conference.
- Cohen, S. (1994). Incentives Contracts as a Signal of the Principal's Private Information. EIASM Conference on Mathematical Models of Organizations and Decision Making.
- Cohen, S., & Arvan, L. (1992). Incentive Contracts as a Signal of the Principal's Private Information. EURO/TIMS Joint International Conference.
- Cohen, S., & Starks, L. (1989). Incentive Contracts for Protfolio Managers. Institute for Quantitative Analysis in Finance.
- Cohen, S., Leatherwood, M., & Monahan, G. (1988). A Theory of Reputation and Contracting. TIMS/ORSA.
- Monahan, G., Cohen, S., & Leatherwood, M. (1988). A Theory of Reputation and Contracting. National ORSA/TIMS Conference.
- Cohen, S., & Starks, L. (1985). Incentive Contracts for Portfolio Managers. TIMS/ORSA.
- Cohen, S., & Loeb, M. (1984). Theory and Experiments in Decentralized Organizations. International TIMS.
- Cohen, S. (1981). Truth-Telling as a Dominant Strategy in an Iterative Groves Mechanism. Public Choice Society.
- Cohen, S. (1977). Incentive Compatible Control of the Multidivisional Firm with Iterative Communication. Econometric Society.
- Cohen, S. (1977). Incentive Compatible Control of the Multidivisional Firm Using Iterative Decomposition Algorithms. TIMS/ORSA.
Working Papers
- Cohen, S. Attorney's Contract, Incentives and Reputation.
- Cohen, S. Incentive Contracts as a Signal of the Principal's Private Information.
- Cohen, S. Incentive Properties of Iterative Decomposition Algorithms.
- Cohen, S. Information Revelation and Pareto Optimal Contracts.
- Cohen, S. Long Term Agency Relationships and Human Capital Investment.
- Cohen, S. Pareto Optimality and Bidding for Contracts.
- Cohen, S. The Relationship Between Auditors, Actuaries, and the Principals They Work For.
- Cohen, S. Theory and Experiments in Decentralized Organizations.
Teaching Interests
Teaches courses in quantitative analysis and the economics of decision making.
Research Interests
Research focuses on production and decision and information sciences.