Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
IBE Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Business Administration
Listings
Educational Background
- Ph.D., Games and Optimization, Minors: Applied Probability/Statistics and Mathematics, Cornell University, 1978
- A.B., Cum Laude, Chemistry and Physics, Harvard University, 1973
Positions Held
- Part time faculty (German), Parkland Community College, 2013-2014
- IBE Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 2011 to present
- IBE Distinguished Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 2006-2011
- Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1989-2011
- Associate Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1985-1989
- Assistant Professor of Business Administration, University of Illinois, 1982-1985
- Assistant Professor of Industrial Engineering, University of Illinois, 1980-1983
- Research Associate and Lecturer, Yale University, 1977-1980
- Mathematical Analyst, Logistics Systems, Inc., 1973-1974
Recent Publications
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. (2009). A Direct Test of Risk Aversion and Regret in First Price Sealed-Bid Auctions. Decision Analysis, 6 (2), 75-86.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. (2008). Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions. Management Science, 54 (4), 808-819.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. (2007). Regret in Auctions: Theory and Evidence. Economic Theory, 33 (1), 81-101.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Haruvy, E., & Katok, E. (2007). A Comparison of Buyer-Determined and Price-Based Multi-Attribute Mechanisms. Marketing Science, 26 (5), 629-641.
Other Publications
Articles
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. (2006). e-Sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior in Reverse Auctions with Non-Competitive Contracts. Management Science, 52 581-596.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., List, J., & Reiley, D. (2006). Demand Reduction in Multi-unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders: Theory and Evidence from a Sports Card Field Experiment. International Economic Review, 47 203-231.
- Deltas, G., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (2005). Naive Bidding. Management Science, 51 (3), 328-338.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2005). Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Management Science, 51 (3), 356-371.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., List, J., & Reiley, D. (2005). Demand Reduction in Multi-unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply. American Economic Review, 95 (1), 472-476.
- Chakraborty, I., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (2005). Asymptotic Prices in Uniform-Price Actions. Economic Theory, 26 983-987.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (2002). Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins. Southern Economic Journal, 68 (3), 617-31.
- Chakraborty, I., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (2001). Corners and Collusion in Auctions. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 10 (4), 241-52.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (2001). The Effect of Entry and Information Costs in Oral-versus Sealed-Bid Auctions. Economics Letters, 70 (2), 185-202.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Deltas, G. (2001). Auctions With an Inexpert Bidder. Economics Letters, 73 (1), 35-42.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Menezes, F. (2001). Why Do Bidders Drop Out from a Sequential Auction. Revista Brasileira de Economia, 55 (1), 33-51.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1999). Calibration of a Model of the Afternoon Effect in Cattle Auctions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 39 (1), 113-128.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1999). An Example of Multi-unit Auctions with Atypically Many Equilibria. Economics Letters, 65 (1), 67-69.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Nonnenmacher, T. (1999). A Theoretical Basis for 19th-Century Changes to the Port of New York Imported Goods Auction. Explorations in Economic History, 36 232-245.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Multi-Unit Auctions with Uniform Prices. Economic Theory, 12 (2), 227-258.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Kahn, C. (1998). Uniform-Price Auctions with Variable Awards. Games and Economics Behavior, 23 (1), 25-42.
Book Chapters
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E., Morgan, J. (Ed.) (2005). Experiments on auction valuation and endogenous entry. Behavioral and Experimental Economics ( pp. 171-196). Stamford, CT: Elsevier Science Ltd.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Klemperer, E. (Ed.) (2000). Optimal Auctions Revisited. The Economic Theory of Auctions ( pp. 526-538). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Shubik, M., and Stark, R. M. (Ed.) (1983). An Introduction to the Theory of Bidding for a Single Object. Auctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory ( pp. 53-104). New York: University Press.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Ransey, J. (Ed.) (1981). An Academician's Thoughts on Modeling. Economics of Exploration for Energy Resources Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Books and Monographs
- Mennemeyer, S., Christianson, J., Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Ghemwat, P. (1987). Competitive Bidding for Durable Medical Equipment and Clinical Laboratory Services: A Review of the Related Literature. Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, Inc.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., Shubik, M., & Stark, R. (1983). Auctions, Bidding and Contracting: Uses and Theory. New York: University Press.
Presentations
- Agrawal, A., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (2012). Competitive Procurement with Post-Award Specification Changes. UIUC Operations Management Seminar Series.
- Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1999). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Universite de Toulouse.
- Kahn, C., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1998). Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending Price Auctions. Conference on Auctions/National Science Foundation.
Working Papers
- Agrawal, A., & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. Competitive Procurement with Post-Award Specification Changes.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. The Buyer-Determined Multi-Attribute Auction: Theoretical and Empirical Characterization.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. e-Sourcing in Procurement: Theory and Behavior ineverse Auctions with Non-Competitive Contracts.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Katok, E. Regret in Auctions: Theory and Evidence.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R., & Chakraborty, I. Truthfull Bidding in Multi-Unit, Uniform-Price Auctions.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. Naive Bidding.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders: Theory and Evidence from a.
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. Notes on the Effect of Varying the Number of Bidders on Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions.
Teaching Interests
Teaches courses in operations research, quantitative analysis of decisions and mathematical programming for management science.
Research Interests
Research focuses on operations research, decision sciences.
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